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Abstract
We present an approach to generalization of practical Identity-Based Encryption
scheme of [BF01]. In particular we show how the protocol could be used on finite
modular lattices and as a special case on vector spaces over finite field. The original
proof of security for this protocol does not hold in this general algebraic structure, thus
this is still a work in progress.
1 Introduction
The goal of this work is to investigate the possibility of generalization of practical Identity-
Based Encryption scheme of [BF01] into a different algebraic structure. Specifically we use
finite modular lattices instead of cyclic groups and replace the original pairing on elliptic
curves with a special pairing on modular lattices.
2 Preliminaries
Here we introduce the necessary formalism.
2.1 Security Model for Identity-Based Encryption
We review the standard security model for Identity-Based Encryption as can be found in
[BF01,Gen06].
An IBE scheme consists of four randomized algorithms: Setup, KeyGen, Encrypt, and De-
crypt. Setup sets the Private Key Generator’s (PKG) parameters params and a master key
master-key. KeyGen is a probabilistic algorithm that generates a private key for an identity
using master-key. Encrypt encrypts a message, taking an identity and params as input, and
outputs a ciphertext. Decrypt decrypts a ciphertext for an identity using a private key for
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that identity.
Boneh and Franklin define IND-ID-CCA security (indistinguishability under adaptive
identity and adaptive chosen ciphertext attack) via the following game.
Setup: The challenger runs Setup, and sends params to the adversary while keeping
the master key to itself.
Phase 1: The adversary issues queries q1, . . . , qm where qi is one of the following:
• Key-extraction query 〈IDi〉: the challenger runs KeyGen on IDi and forwards
the resulting private key to the adversary.
• Decryption query 〈IDi, Ci〉: the challenger runs KeyGen on IDi, decrypts Ci
with the resulting private key, and sends the result to the adversary.
Adversary can make these queries adaptively, i.e., any query may depend on the
previous queries as well as their answers.
Challenge: The adversary submits two equal length plaintexts M0,M1 ∈ M and
an identity ID. Obviously, ID must not have appeared in any key generation query
in Phase 1. The challenger selects uniformly at random a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, obtains
a ciphertext C = Encrypt(params, ID,Mb), and sends C to the adversary as its
challenge ciphertext.
Phase 2: This is identical to Phase 1, except that the adversary may not request a
private key for ID or the decryption of (ID,C).
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1} for b. The adversary wins if b = b′.
The advantage of the adversary in attacking the IBE scheme is defined as:
Adv = |Pr[(b = b′)]− 1/2| (1)
We call the adversary in the above game an IND-ID-CCA adversary.
Definition 2.1.1 An IBE system is (t, qID, qC , ǫ) IND-ID-CCA secure if all t-time IND-ID-
CCA adversaries making at most qID private key queries and at most qC chosen ciphertext
queries have advantage at most ǫ in winning the above game.
IND-ID-CPA security is defined similarly, only with the restriction that the adversary
cannot make decryption queries.
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Definition 2.1.2 An IBE system is (t, qID, ǫ) IND-ID-CPA secure if it is (t, qID, 0, ǫ) IND-
ID-CCA secure.
2.2 Bilinear Maps and Pairings
We will generalize the standard notion of a bilinear map [BF01,BB04,Gen06]. The standard
setting is following:
• G and GT are two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order p;
• g is a generator of G.
LetG andGT be two groups as above. An (admissible) bilinear map is a map e : G×G→ GT
with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: for all u, v ∈ G and a, b ∈ Z, we have e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab.
• Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1.
• Computability: there is an efficient algorithm to compute e(u, v) for any u, v ∈ G
We say that G is a bilinear group if the group action in G can be computed efficiently and
there exists a group GT and an efficiently computable bilinear map e : G × G → GT as
above. Note that e(, ) is symmetric since e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab = e(gb, ga).
We will call the generalization of the bilinear map a pairing:
Definition 2.2.1 Let X, Y be finite sets and A be a semigroup acting on X from the left.
Then a mapping e : X ×X → Y is called a pairing on X iff e is bilinear, that means:
e(ax1, x2) = e(x1, ax2), for all x1, x2 ∈ X and a ∈ A.
Note also that we will use the bilinear property in both coordinates:
e(ax1, bx2) = e(x1, abx2) = e(x1, b(ax2)) = e(bx1, ax2).
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
Let X, Y be finite sets and A be a semigroup acting on X and Y from the left. We will
assume the following problems are hard:
• Discrete Log problem (DLP): p ∈ X , for given (p, ap) determine a.
3
• Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) in 〈X, Y, e〉 [BF01]: for given (x, y, ax, bx) find
e(ax, by), for x, y ∈ X .
An algorithm A has advantage ǫ in solving BDH in 〈X, Y, e〉 if
Pr[A(x, y, ax, bx) = e(ax, by)] ≥ ǫ
where the probability is over the random choice of a, b ∈ A, the random choice of x, y ∈ X ,
and the random bits of A.
BDH Assumtion.
We say that the BDH problem is (t, ǫ)-hard in X if no t-time algorithm can solve BDH
problem with advantage at least ǫ.
Hardness of BDH.
The BDH problem in 〈X, Y, e〉 is no harder than the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem
(CDH) in X or Y . The converse is still an open problem: is an algorithm for BDH sufficient
for solving CDH?.
The best known algorithm for BDH is to solve DLP in either X or Y .
2.4 Brief modular lattice theory
Now we introduce some basic notions of lattice theory, a good reference is the book [Gratz].
Definition 2.4.1 A poset (L,≤) is called a lattice, if for every finite subset A ⊂ L there
exists a join (least upper bound)
∨
A and a meet (greatest lower bound)
∧
A in L.
For a finite L, we define the least and the greatest element of L respectively as O :=
∧
L
and I :=
∨
L.
For a, b ∈ L, an interval is
[a, b] := {x ∈ L|a ≤ x ≤ b}.
An equivalent universal algebraic definition of lattice is
Definition 2.4.2 An algebra (L,∧,∨) is called a lattice if L is a nonempty set, ∧ and ∨
are binary operations on L, both ∧ and ∨ are idempotent, commutative, and associative, and
they satisfy the absorption law.
A note on notation:
in the rest of the text we will be using symbols + and · instead of more common ∨, ∧ for
the two binary operations on a lattice, respectively.
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Definition 2.4.3 A lattice  L is called modular if for all a, b, c ∈ L the following holds:
a ≤ c⇒ (a+ b) · c = a + b · c. (2)
An example is a normal subgroup lattice of a group is modular.
Lemma 2.4.4 For a lattice L, the following is equivalent:
• L is modular;
• L does not contain the lattice N5 as a sublattice;
• for all a, b, c, d ∈ L
d ≤ b⇒ (a · b+ c) · d = (a+ c · b) · d.
Definition 2.4.5 A lattice is said to be distributive if it satisfies for all x, y, z ∈ L either
(and therefore both) of the distributive laws:
• x · (y + z) = (x · y) + (x · z)
• x+ (y · z) = (x+ y) · (x+ z).
The following is an easy observation.
Lemma 2.4.6 Every distributive lattice is modular.
Examples of distributive lattices include Boolean lattices, totally ordered sets, and the sub-
group lattices of locally cyclic groups.
Definition 2.4.7 A complement of a in a lattice  L with O and I is an element b ∈ L such
that
a · b = O and a + b = I.
A bounded lattice  L is complemented if all its elements have complements.
Remark 2.4.8 Complements may not exist. If L is a non-trivial chain, then no element
(other than O and I) has a complement. This also shows that if a is a complement of a
non-trivial element b, then a and b form an antichain.
In a complemented lattice, there may be more than one complement corresponding to each
element.
Definition 2.4.9 Two elements are said to be related, (or perspective) if they have a com-
mon complement.
Remark 2.4.10 If a complemented lattice L is a distributive lattice, then L is uniquely
complemented (in fact, a Boolean lattice).
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3 The generalized IBE protocol
In the following we will present an approach to a generalization of an IBE protocol by Boneh
and Franklin [BF01].
3.1 The Boneh-Franklin protocol on modular lattices
Definition 3.1.1 Let  L be a modular lattice and d ∈ L is fixed. Then the semigroup A :=
[d, 1] acts on L and the mapping
ed : L× L→ [0, d], (x, y) 7→ d · (x+ y) (3)
is said to be a lattice pairing.
It is easy to see that the lattice pairing is indeed a pairing.
We assume the pairing e and the A-action are both nondegenerate and efficiently computable.
Definition 3.1.2 Let Fq be the field with q elements and n ∈ N. The projective space
(geometry) of dimension n− 1 and order q is the lattice
L(Fnq ) := {S ⊂ F
n
q |S is a subspace}. (4)
Subspaces of dimension 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 are referred to as points, lines, . . . , hyperplanes in
this geometry.
The Gaussian coefficients determine the number of subspaces of a given dimension k. The
formula is [
n
k
]
q
:=
(1− qn)(1− qn−1) . . . (1− qn+1−k)
(1− qk)(1− qk−1) . . . (1− q)
. (5)
Just for the sake of clarity we take a small example of a lattice  L := L(F5q) for some q and
show the use of the protocol for ID-based encryption devised by Boneh and Franklin in 2001.
In this case we can use standard geometrical names for our objects. The one, two, three and
four - dimensional subspaces of the projective space L(F5q) are called points, lines, planes
and hyperplanes, respectively.
There are two users with some identities and a trusted authority (TA) issuing user’s private
keys in the protocol.
Given  L and a fixed line d ∈  L, the protocol proceeds as follows:
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Setup: TA chooses a plane P ∈  L, d 6≤ P , a hyperplane s ∈R  L,
d ≤ s, P 6≤ s, computes a line Ppub := P ·s, chooses cryptographic hash
functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗ →  L and H2 :  L → {0, 1}
n, where n is the bit
length of messages.
The private master key is s and the global public key is Ppub.
Extract: given a user’s public ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute the user’s public
key QID = H1(ID) ∈  L (a plane), d 6≤ QID, QID 6≤ s, and the private
key SID = s ·QID.
Encrypt: given message M, choose a secret hyperplane r ∈R  L, d ≤ r,
P 6≤ r, QID 6≤ r, and compute
C = {r · P,M ⊕H2(ed(QID · r, Ppub))}.
Decrypt: given the ciphertext C = {U, V }, recover the plaintext
M = V ⊕H2(ed(SID, U)).
To verify the correctness of the protocol just substitute for SID, U, V and use the property
of pairing.
Remark 3.1.3 The protocol does not work for distributive lattices, as
ed(QIDr, Ps) = d(QIDr + Ps) = dQIDr + dPs = QIDd+ Pd,
which is a public element.
We can make the following observations:
• The projective line [0, d] has q + 1 (nontrivial) points.
• The number of lines of the plane [d, 1] (choice of r, s) is q2 + q + 1.
• The requirements d ≤ s and d ≤ r cannot be dropped as we need them for the
bilinearity of ed.
• Thus there are only (dim s− dim d) unknown dimensions in s and similarly for r.
• Therefore for practical use it is necessary to consider a projective space with much
higher dimension.
• A good choice of a dimension of the element d seems to be n/2 as then both the set of
hyperplanes containing d (choice of r, s) and the set of elements contained in d (range
of ed) are about the same size (and ’large’ enough).
7
There are several nontrivial possibilities for choosing other elements of the protocol, one such
choice could be this one:
• rP, sP, rQID, sQID are lines different from d.
• rP + sQID is a hyperplane different from r and s.
• The pairing ed(rP, sQID) = (rP + sQID)d is a point.
A general weakness of this protocol is that repeated use of the system enables a user to learn
about the choice of s. This can be resolved by bounding the number of issued private keys
for a given master key.
In the general case of  L := L(Fnq ), where n is large enough, we suggest the following choices:
• The element d is chosen from ⌊n/2⌋-dimensional elements of the lattice.
• The element P is chosen among the elements of dimensions ranging from ⌊n/2⌋+1 to
n− 3, so that it does not contain d (avoids the sublattice [d, 1]).
• The secret key s is selected uniformly at random from the elements of dimension n− 1
(and possibly also of dimension n− 2) that are contained in the sublattice [d, 1].
• The hash function H1 maps the user’s ID to the lattice elements of dimensions ranging
from ⌊n/2⌋+1 to n− 2, so that it does not contain d (and is not contained in s). But
is it necessary to exclude the element P ?
• The secret r is selected uniformly at random from the elements of dimension n−1 and
n− 2 that are contained in the sublattice [d, 1]
• The pairing ed maps to the sublattice [0, d] (avoiding 0 and d), that has height ⌊n/2⌋.
What is missing: proof of hardness of BDH problem in L(Fnq ) and investigation of feasibility
of the pairing.
This should include
• a bound on the size of q(n);
• a good representation of modular lattices (like vector spaces).
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3.2 The special case of a vector space
In this section we will consider a special case of a finite modular non-distributive lattice of
subspaces of an n-dimensional vector space V := Fnq over finite field Fq.
We will represent this vector space and its subspaces in a standard way, i.e. by matrices
of size m × n over Fq for some m. Representing operations of intersection and union of
subspaces is easy too as there is a basis in every vector space.
If we choose uniformly at random two vector subspaces V1 and V2 of V, dimV1 = m
′
1 < n
and dimV2 = m
′
2 < n, we would like to know the expected value of dim(V1 ∪ V2).
We can easily compute the expected dimension of intersection of these two random spaces
E(dim(V1 ∩ V2)) = E(dimV1) + E(dimV2)− E(dim(V1 ∪ V2)), (6)
as the intersection and union of two vector spaces is also a vector space and expectation is
a linear function.
Let M1 and M2 be two matrices created by randomly sampling m1 and m2 vectors of length
n respectively (their ranks might be smaller than m1 and m2). These matrices will represent
the random subspaces V1 and V2. We are interested in the dimension of the union of these
two subspaces, thus we join the two matrices and investigate the rank of the matrix of size
m× n, where m = m1 +m2.
In the same way as did Linial and Weitz in [LW00], we denote the collection of m × n
matrices over Fq by Mm,n,q, and this same set with a uniform distribution is the probability
space Ωm,n,q. The rank of matrices can be seen as an integer-valued random variable on
Ωm,n,q.
The rank distribution is well known:
Lemma 3.2.1 Let 0 ≤ r ≤ min{m,n}, m ≤ n and M be a matrix from Ωm,n,q.
Then
Pr(rankM = r) =
1
q(n−r)(m−r)
r−1∏
i=0
(1− qi−n)(1− qi−m)
1− qi−r
. (7)
In the special case when r = m, the matrix must be regular, so every newly added vector is
independent from the linear span of the previously added vectors.
Pr(rankM = m) =
m−1∏
i=0
(1− qi−n).
9
More details behind the following valuable observations can be found in Linial and Weitz
[LW00]:
• A randomly chosen m × n matrix M has almost surely full rank (i.e. min{m,n}) iff
|n−m| is unbounded (grows to infinity with n).
• If |n−m| is bounded, then Pr(rankM ≤ r)→ 0 iff r ≤ min{m,n}−ω(1), i.e. almost
full rank is almost certain.
Here ”almost surely” means that the probability grows to 1 exponentially with increasing n.
The description of the B-F protocol for the special case of a vector space with some concrete
choices of sizes of elements follows.
Setup: Given n-dimensional vector space over Fq, choose uniformly at random
⌈5n/16⌉ vectors to form the parameter d. For P randomly choose ⌈n/2⌉ vectors, to
form S take the vectors of d and add ⌈9n/16⌉ random vectors.
Extract: For a given ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, choose ⌈n/2⌉ vectors to form QID and secret R
will be formed in the same way as S. Set the private key to S ·QID.
Encrypt & Decrypt: Same as before. Analysis follows.
According to the observation, with high probability all these subspaces have full dimension.
Then the hard problem in the protocol is:
for given (QID, Ppub, P · R,P ), find ed(QID · R,Ppub).
This problem is not harder than finding R, S given P,QID, QID · R,P · S, which could be
seen as a variant of the discrete logarithm problem in vector spaces. But the exact relation
to the original Billinear Diffie Hellman problem on elliptic curves is unclear.
The dimensions of QID · R and Ppub = P · S is with high probability equal to ⌈7n/8⌉ +
⌈n/2⌉ − n = ⌈3n/8⌉. Thus with high probability the dimension of QID ·R+ Ppub is equal to
⌈3n/4⌉. And so finally the dimension of ed(QID · R,Ppub) is with high probability equal to
⌈n/16⌉.
We can easily compute the number of spaces that contain some fixed space as a subspace
due to the duality of the structure and using Gaussian coefficients.
The number of vector spaces of dimension ⌈3n/4⌉ that contain a fixed space of dimen-
sion ⌈n/2⌉ is
[
⌈n/2⌉
⌈n/4⌉
]
q
≥ qn
2/16. And the number of subspaces of dimension ⌈3n/4⌉ is
10
[
n
⌈3n/4⌉
]
q
≥ q3n
2/16.
3.3 In a search for security proof
The reason why we cannot use the same proof technique as in [BF01] is simple: in a vector
space we are missing the multiplicative group structure.
The original Boneh-Franklin proof of IND-ID-CPA security of the identity based protocol is
done in two steps.
The first step is to show that if an adversary can break the ID based protocol with some
advantage ǫ, then there is an algorithm that can break a standard public key protocol (called
BasicPub in [BF01]) with advantage ǫ
e(1+qE)
, where qE is the number of queries to the ran-
dom oracle used for issuing public keys. This standard protocol is similar to the ID based
one, just the queries for private keys are removed.
The second step is to show that if an adversary has some advantage against the public key
protocol (without identity queries for public keys) then there is an algorithm that solves
BDH problem with some non-trivial advantage.
The first part of the proof actually shows that private key extraction queries do not help the
adversary. It does that by constructing a table that substitutes the hash function answers
for these queries. But unfortunately, it relies on the existence of inverse elements in groups
which we cannot get in a vector space.
Concretely when we simulate the first hash function we output b ·QID as the public key for
the identity on which the adversary wants to be challenged.
We want to decrypt C = {U, V }, thus we compute an inverse of b in the group, and send
the adversary the ciphertext C ′ = {b−1 · U, V }.
We observe that decryption of C ′ using private key s · b ·QID is the same as decryption of C
using s ·QID:
e(b−1 · U, s · b ·QID) = e(U, s · b
−1 · b ·QID) = e(U, s ·QID).
In the second part, we have to simulate the other hash function used in the ID-based protocol.
But this function maps from a group to {0, 1}n and thus we can easily replace the group
with the vector space, as we are not using the structural properties of a group.
As IND-ID-CCA security is stronger than IND-ID-CPA security, this proof will not work for
it either.
As we do not have the advantage of multiplicative group structure in a vector space, we
cannot use the standard proof technique.
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3.4 Another approach: direct product  Ln
Another approach to this problem might be to take a small (possibly the smallest) lattice
 L (vector space) for which the aforementioned protocol is non-trivial and then do the direct
product of sufficiently large number of copies of this lattice. This construction will give us
an exponentially large secret key.
4 Conclusions
We failed to properly generalize the original Boneh-Franklin protocol to the case of modular
lattices. The security proof of the original protocol depends on the multiplicative group
structure which we are loosing when generalising to modular lattices. One possible way to
proceed might be to use the direct product  Ln of n small lattices  L for which is the protocol
non-trivial.
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